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Abstract 
 
By examining the Washington to Puerto Rico flow of funds in some detail and comparing 
it with the flow of federal funds to the states, this paper demonstrates that the island’s 
receipt of funds is not uniquely large and cannot be viewed as representing the “largess” 
of U.S. taxpayers.  The funds coming from Washington to Puerto Rico cannot bear the 
weight of responsibility for the island’s economic problems that various sources have 
placed upon them.  Puerto Rico’s economic ills have to be explained by a larger set of 
factors.  Nonetheless, some of the Washington to Puerto Rico transfer programs may 
create a set of incentives that are not in the interests of Puerto Ricans.  As a result, the 
policy prescriptions offered here have much in common with those of analysts who see 
the transfer programs as a major problem, in particular with regard to the Earned Income 
Tax Credit.  The policy prescriptions offered here, however, go beyond others in 
suggesting a more favorable treatment of Puerto Rico with regard to federal procurements 
and the Child Tax Credit.  An overall message of the analysis is that the flow of federal 
funds could be changed in a positive rather than punitive manner to improve the 
operation of the Puerto Rican economy 
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DRAFT – PLEASE TREAT APPROPRIATELY 
 
Washington Dollars and the Puerto Rican Economy: 
Amounts, Impacts, Alternatives1 
 
Arthur MacEwan and Angel Ruiz 
 
August 2007 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In fiscal year 2004, Puerto Rico received $15.475 billion from the federal 
government, including funds in all categories of federal expenditures – ranging from 
federal procurements and federal salaries to support for the Nutritional Assistance 
Program, from Social Security and Medicare payments to grants for the public schools.  
This amounted to $4,003 per person on the island, as compared to per capita personal 
income of $11,844.2 
 
 Was this a lot or a little?  How did the federal funds received by Puerto Rico 
compare with the federal funds received by the fifty states and DC?  Which categories of 
funds flowing to Puerto Rico and the states from Washington were large and which were 
small?  How might these funds have affected economic activity in Puerto Rico?  Are 
there alternative ways that federal funds could be directed to Puerto Rico such that the 
economic impact would be more positive? 
 
 These sorts of questions about the Puerto Rican economy and its relation to 
policies in Washington have long been of interest.  They have, however, been given new 
urgency in recent years by the relatively slow growth of the Puerto Rican economy and 
by a number of pronouncements to the effect that funds from Washington are responsible 
for the island’s economic problems, for the low rate of economic growth and a low level 
                                                 
1
 Paper to be presented to the Asociación de Economistas de Puerto Rico, La Vigésimacuarta Asamblea 
Anual, Estrategia Económica De Puerto Rico, 24 de Agosto de 2007. The authors are, respectively, 
Professor of Economics at the University of Massachussets Boston and Professor of Economics in the 
Doctoral Program of Business Administration, Interamerican University of Puerto Rico, Metropolitan 
Branch. 
 
2
 More recent data providing the detail necessary for the empirical work presented here are not yet 
available.  In particular, the Consolidated Federal Funds Report for Fiscal Year 2004, issued in December 
2005 by the U.S. Census Bureau, is the most recent such report available.  We are grateful to Arjuna Costa 
for many of the calculations on which this paper is based. 
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of participation in the paid labor force.  These pronouncements have appeared in both the 
popular media and scholarly publications. 
 
 On October 23, 2006, for example, an editorial in the New York Times lamented 
the poor economic condition of Puerto Rico and told its readers: “Much of the blame can 
be put on Washington.”  Suggesting that Puerto Rico was getting too much support from 
Washington, the Times continued:  
 
“The study [by the Center for the New Economy (CNE) and the Brookings 
Institution] is spurring a debate over welfare and other social programs.  
Some of the economists’ prescriptions are harsh, including curtailment of 
food stamps.  But part of the mission seems to be shock therapy.  That 
may work and might even help to get policy makers on the search for 
solutions.”3 
 
In its May 25, 2006, issue, The Economist, also drawing on the volume from the 
CNE and Brookings, had published an article under the heading: “Trouble on 
Welfare Island: Overbearing government and the welfare state are hurting the 
United States' poorest citizens.”  The Economist opined that in Puerto Rico, 
“Many things have gone wrong. Most important, however, is that the United 
States government assumed too big a role in the Puerto Rican economy…”  The 
“largess” of the U.S. government and “generous United States taxpayers” have, 
according to The Economist, generated a perverse set of practices and incentives 
that keeps labor participation low and undermines ambitions. 
 
 The scholarly analyses in the CNE-Brookings volume are more carefully 
stated and their conclusions are qualified.  Yet it is readily apparent how the 
Times and The Economist pulled from this volume the message that excessive 
federal funds flowing to Puerto Rico are a foundation of the island’s economic 
problems.  Two complementary chapters in the CNE-Brookings report are 
especially relevant: “Labor Supply and Public Transfers” by Gary Burtless and 
Orlando Sotomayor, and “Why Don’t More Puerto Rican Men Work? The Rich 
Uncle (Sam) Hypothesis” by María E. Enchautegui and Richard B. Freeman. 
 
 The Burtless-Sotomayor essay repeatedly describes the transfer payments 
from Washington to Puerto Rico as “generous” and argues: 
 
“Low-income Puerto Ricans enjoy relatively generous income 
supplements and retirement benefits without imposing heavy tax burdens 
on highly compensated workers.  The transfers received by less affluent 
citizens depress the incentive for them to work or to migrate to the 
mainland to find better jobs or wages.  Because the commonwealth does 
                                                 
3
 The “study” referred to by the Times is The Economy of Puerto Rico: Restoring Growth, edited by Susan 
M. Collins, Barry P. Bosworth, and Miguel A. Soto-Class, Center for the New Economy, San Juan, and 
Brookings Institution, Washington, 2006.   
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not have to pay for all these transfers, benefits are almost certainly more 
generous than would be the case if their full cost fell on island taxpayers.  
As a result, relatively generous redistribution on behalf of Puerto Rico’s 
poor, aged, and disabled populations reduces employment rates below 
where they would be if all transfers in the island were financed with taxes 
imposed on Puerto Rican residents.” (page 82-3, emphasis added)4 
 
Enchautegui and Freeman, examine a variety of factors affecting the labor force 
participation rate of Puerto Rican men, including the possible incentive impact of 
transfer payments but also other aspects of the Puerto Rico-Washington 
relationship.  Yet the central theme of their argument, that the largess of a “rich 
uncle (Sam)” is responsible for much of Puerto Rico’s economic difficulties, 
carries the same basic message as that of Burtless and Sotomayor.  It is, 
moreover, a message that resonates through much of the CNE-Brookings volume. 
 
 Yet the picture presented in these popular and scholarly sources is highly 
misleading.  A full examination of the flow of funds from Washington to Puerto 
Rico does not justify the “generous” characterization.  A comparison of the 
situation of Puerto Rico to that of the individual states shows that the island’s 
receipt of funds is not uniquely large and cannot be viewed as representing the 
“largess” of U.S. taxpayers (or a “rich uncle”).  A more complete picture of the 
situation suggests that the funds coming from Washington to Puerto Rico cannot 
bear the weight of responsibility for the island’s economic problems that these 
various sources place upon them.  The economic ills given attention by Burtless 
and Sotomayor and by Enchautegui and Freeman have to be explained by a larger 
set of factors. 
 
 Nonetheless, some of the Washington-to-Puerto Rico transfer programs 
may create a set of incentives that are not in the interests of Puerto Ricans.  As a 
result, the policy prescriptions offered here have much in common with those of 
Burtless and Sotomayor and Enchautegui and Freeman, in particular with regard 
to the Earned Income Tax Credit – though the prescriptions offered here go 
beyond theirs in suggesting a more favorable treatment of Puerto Rico with regard 
to federal procurements and the Child Tax Credit.  Equally important, the analysis 
here does not provide support for the argument that Puerto Rico is getting “too 
much” and that the correction for the island’s economic ills may lie in a cut-off in 
the manner suggested in the Times’ call for “shock therapy.”  Indeed, an overall 
message of the analysis here is that the flow of federal funds could be changed in 
a positive rather than punitive manner to improve the operation of the Puerto 
Rican economy 
                                                 
4
 The emphasis given by Burtless and Sotomayor to the point that the benefits received in Puerto Rico do 
not place a tax burden on highly compensated Puerto Ricans is somewhat misleading.  In their analysis, 
benefits received through payroll taxes are an important issue, and Puerto Ricans pay the payroll taxes just 
like citizens in all of the states.  In this regard, then, the situation of Puerto Rico is the same as that of the 
individual states. 
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II.  How Large is the Flow of Funds to Puerto Rico: Comparison with the 
States 
 
A.  A Starting Point: The Gross Flow of Funds 
 
 There are various ways to appraise the magnitude of funds flowing from 
Washington to Puerto Rico.  To begin with, taking as a starting point the $4,003 per 
capita that Puerto Rico received in fiscal year 2004, the island received less from the 
federal government than did any state or the District of Columbia (DC).  In that year, the 
average per capita funds going to the states, DC and Puerto Rico was $7,273.  Thus, in 
per capita terms, Puerto Rico received 55 percent of the average.   
 
What was true overall was also true in almost every broad category of funds that go 
from the federal government to the states, DC and Puerto Rico: in per capita terms, 
Puerto Rico was at the bottom or near the bottom of the list.  A summary of Puerto Rico’s 
position for fiscal year 2004 is shown in Table 1.5  Regarding the various categories of 
funds shown in Table 1: 
 
• In the largest category, which includes social security, disability and Medicare, in 
fiscal year 2004 Puerto Rico received $1,903 per capita, less than any state or DC; 
this was only 58.6 percent of the average.  Puerto Ricans pay the payroll taxes 
that contribute to the financing of these receipts. 
 
• In the category “other direct payments,” which includes funds for the Nutritional 
Assistance Program (food stamps) and other welfare-type payments, Puerto 
Rico’s position rises to 49th.6  Its receipts per capita of $331 in fiscal year 2004 
were 72.9 percent of the average. All payments in this category amounted to 2.8 
percent of per capita personal income in Puerto Rico in 2004. (See notes to Table 
1 for more on the content of this category.) 
 
• In the large category of “grants” – second to social security, disability and 
Medicare – Puerto Rico received $1,373 per capita and rose to 38th on the list (89 
percent of the average).  This category includes several programs that are 
designed – either by formula or discretionary policy – to support low-income 
areas. (See notes to Table 1 for more on the content of this category.)  
                                                 
5
 Data in the tables for this paper are from the following sources: IRS Data Book, FY 2004; Consolidated 
Federal Funds Report for Fiscal Year 2004, U.S. Census Bureau; Bureau of Economic Analysis: Regional 
Economic Accounts; Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico. 
 
6
 The food stamp program as such has not existed in Puerto Rico since 1982, when, as pointed out by 
Burtless and Sotomayor, “…the federal government eliminated the standard food stamp program in Puerto 
Rico and replaced it with a nutrition block grant payable to the commonwealth government…To maintain a 
food assistance program under a smaller budget, the commonwealth government established a replacement 
program known as the Nutritional Assistance Program (NAP).” (p. 99). 
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Table 1: Federal Government Payments to Puerto Rico Per Capita; Rank of Puerto 
Rico Among States, DC, and Puerto Rico; and Payments to Puerto Rico as a 
Percentage of Average to States, DC and Puerto Rico, Fiscal Year 2004 
 
Category of Payments Amount per capita Rank Percent of Average 
Retirement, Disability & Medicare         $1,903 52          58.6 
Other Direct Payments7              331 49          72.9 
EITC and CTC8                13 52            5.3 
Grants9           1,373     38          89.0 
Salaries and Wages              265 52          35.6 
Salaries and Wages w/o Defense              180 52          41.0 
Procurement              119 52          11.1 
Procurement w/o Defense                46 52          11.6 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Other Direct Payments consist primarily of direct payments for individuals, other than retirement, 
disability and Medicare.  Major categories of such payments include unemployment compensation, food 
stamp payments, federal employees’ life and health insurance and agricultural assistance. 
 
8
 Tax credits under the Earned Income Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit Programs.  Puerto Ricans are 
generally not eligible for either of these credits with regard to income earned on the island; they are eligible 
for the Child Tax Credit if they have three or more children.  
 
9
 Grants include both Formula Grants (allocation of money to states and subdivisions according to a 
distribution formula prescribed by law and not related to a specific program) and Project Grants (funding of 
either specific projects or the delivery of specific products and services).  Principal funders include the 
departments of Health and Human Services, Transportation, HUD, Education and Agriculture.  
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• Puerto Ricans are generally not eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit or the 
Child Tax Credit.  (The main exception is that Puerto Ricans may claim the latter 
when they have three or more children.)  Thus for this “tax expenditure,” Puerto 
Rico is not only at the bottom of the list, but receives only 5.3 percent of the 
average.  
 
• In the categories of federal wages and salaries and procurements, Puerto Rico is 
again at the bottom of the list, receiving 35.6 percent of the average in the former 
category and 11.1 percent in the latter. 
 
Thus when the dispersal of federal funds is viewed in terms of payments per capita, 
Puerto Rico does not appear to receive very much from the federal government.  Quite 
the contrary:  the island receives significantly less than any state or DC.  Even when 
focus is placed on those categories of funds that are usually classified as social welfare or 
as directed toward low-income regions, Puerto Rico does not stand out as a large 
recipient in terms of the per capita receipt of funds from the federal government.  Also, as 
is well known, while federal procurements and federal payments of wages and salaries 
serve other functions as well, they are also used to support jobs and incomes in the 
various parts of the country; and Puerto Rico’s share in this category of funding is 
especially low. 
 
B. The Flow in Relation to Income 
 
When, however, the dispersal of federal funds is viewed in relation to the per capita 
personal income of the states, DC and Puerto Rico, the situation might be subject to a 
different interpretation.  After all, in 2004, per capita personal income in Puerto Rico was 
only slightly more than one-third of per capita personal income in the states, DC and 
Puerto Rico taken all together – $11,844 as compared to $32,620.   
 
Table 2, then, shows that in relation to personal income, Puerto Rico ranked fourth in 
terms of the amount of funds it received from Washington.  For Puerto Rico, in 2004 total 
funds per capita coming from Washington amounted to 33.8 percent of per capita 
personal income.  DC (132.8 percent), Alaska (38.1 percent) and New Mexico (40.2 
percent) each received more in relation to per capita personal income than did Puerto 
Rico; Virginia (33.8 percent), West Virginia (32.8 percent), North Dakota (32.5 percent), 
and Mississippi (31.8 percent) received only slightly less.  Of course in some of these 
states, and especially DC, wages and salaries and procurement play an especially large 
role.  But, again, federal wages and salaries and procurement expenditures are used to 
support jobs and incomes (though DC and perhaps Virginia are special cases). 
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Table 2: Federal Government Payments to Puerto Rico Per Capita as a Percentage 
of Per Capita Personal Income; Rank of Puerto Rico Among States, DC, and Puerto 
Rico; and Payments to Puerto Rico as a Percentage of Average to States, DC and 
Puerto Rico, Fiscal Year 200410 
 
Category of Payments Percent of Per Capita 
Personal Income 
Rank Percent of 
Average 
Retirement, Disability & 
Medicare 
          16.1 2          161.6 
Other Direct Payments             2.8 7           201.1 
EITC and CTC             0.1 52           15.7 
Grants            11.6        3          245.2 
Salaries and Wages             2.2 27          96.5 
Salaries and Wages w/o 
Defense 
            1.5 16         111.5  
Procurement             1.0 51           30.3 
Procurement w/o Defense             0.4 49           32.9 
Total            33.8 4          153.6 
 
                                                 
10
 See notes to Table 1. 
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Table 2 also shows that in no broad category was Puerto Rico receiving the largest 
amount of funds per capita in relation to per capita personal income.  With regard to the 
largest category – retirement, disability and Medicare – West Virginia ranked higher, 
receiving an amount in this category of 17.3 percent of per capita personal income, as 
compared to Puerto Rico’s 16.1 percent.  (In the retirement, disability and Medicare 
category, where Puerto Rico ranks second to the top, it is important to keep in mind, as 
noted above, that Puerto Ricans contribute to the payroll taxes that finance these 
payments – as do people throughout the United States.)  In the other large category, 
grants, Puerto Rico ranked third behind DC and Alaska.  In the “other direct payments” 
category, including the Nutritional Assistance Program (food stamps), Puerto Rico was 
seventh.  And in the procurement category, Puerto Rico is almost at the bottom; and of 
course with regard to CTC and EITC, Puerto Rico is last on the list. 
 
Much of federal payments to states, DC and Puerto Rico is intended and justified 
precisely on the basis that those payments are a means to provide support where incomes 
are low.  This is true not only of such programs as food stamps and the large category of 
“grants,” but it is also to some degree the case for procurements and various other forms 
of federal spending.  Thus, as we would expect, many of the states that rank high in terms 
of the funds they receive relative to personal income are the states with low personal 
income per capita.  Puerto Rico has a per capita personal income well below that of any 
state (in 2004, 48.3 percent of that of Mississippi, the lowest income state).  Still, Puerto 
Rico is not at the top of the list, not overall and not in any category. 
 
C. The Net Flow by Various Measures 
 
Perhaps it could be argued that Puerto Rico receives a large amount of federal funds 
relative to the amount of federal taxes that Puerto Ricans pay.  Puerto Ricans do not pay 
federal income tax on income earned in Puerto Rico, though they do pay federal payroll 
taxes.  Thus the payments by Puerto Rico to the federal government are small relative to 
states.11   
 
Yet, when Puerto Rico, DC and the states are ranked by net receipts per capita from 
the federal government – that is, receipts less federal taxes – Puerto Rico is far from the 
top of the list.  For fiscal year 2004, when all categories of federal expenditures are taken 
into account, Puerto Rico ranks 19th.  Alaska, the highest ranking state, received on net 
$8,005 per capita; Puerto Rico on net received $2,823.12  Table 3 presents these data for 
the fifty states, Puerto Rico, and DC.   
                                                 
11
 As evident in the quote in the Introduction above, Burtless and Sotomayor give some importance to this 
net concept, arguing: “Because the commonwealth does not have to pay for all these transfers, benefits are 
almost certainly more generous than would be the case if their full cost fell on island taxpayers.”  However, 
see footnote number 4 above. 
  
12
 The District of Columbia is at the top of the list, with net per capita receipts of $37,457, but it is clearly a 
special case.  Several of the states, including Alaska and New Mexico (right behind Alaska with $7,348 per 
capita) owe their high rankings to large military expenditures relative to population; and Virginia, next on 
the list, ranks high because of its proximity to Washington.  However, several of the states ranking higher 
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Table 3: Per Capita Net Receipts of Federal               
Funds, 2004: States, Puerto Rico, and DC 
    
(dollars)* 
    
        
 Net Receipts           Rank   
Net 
Receipts 
         
Rank  
District of Columbia 37,457 1  Missouri 1,381 27  
Alaska 8,005 2  Kansas 1,282 28  
New Mexico 7,348 3  Indiana 1,019 29  
Virginia 5,940 4  Oregon 916 30  
West Virginia 5,562 5  New Hampshire 689 31  
North Dakota 5,157 6  Pennsylvania 658 32  
Montana 4,792 7  Washington 525 33  
Mississippi 4,700 8  North Carolina 236 34  
Alabama 4,629 9  California -62 35  
South Dakota 4,389 10  Nevada -129 36  
Maryland 4,383 11  Rhode Island -188 37  
Maine 4,175 12  Michigan -225 38  
South Carolina 3,586 13  Arkansas -310 39  
Kentucky 3,514 14  Georgia -350 40  
Hawaii 3,093 15  Texas -380 41  
Arizona 2,984 16  Wisconsin -473 42  
Wyoming 2,980 17  Massachusetts -837 43  
Louisiana 2,887 18  Colorado -906 44  
Puerto Rico 2,823 19  Ohio -1,181 45  
Vermont 2,596 20  New York -1,370 46  
Idaho 1,887 21  Nebraska -1,385 46  
Oklahoma 1,858 22  Illinois -2,393 48  
Utah 1,826 23  Connecticut -3,223 49  
Iowa 1,768 24  New Jersey -4,025 50  
Florida 1,677 25  Minnesota -5,639 51  
Tennessee 1,557 26  Delaware -7,010 52  
        
* Net receipts are all federal expenditures to the state, Puerto Rico, or DC less total   
taxes paid to the federal government from the state, Puerto Rico, or DC.    
        
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
than Puerto Rico are not obvious “special cases” – for example, West Virginia, Mississippi, Alabama, 
Maine, South Carolina and Louisiana.  
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Puerto Rico’s position may be surprising because, as noted, Puerto Ricans do not pay 
federal income tax on Puerto Rican source income.  The very small amounts of federal 
wages and salaries and federal procurement expenditures received in Puerto Rico provide 
a large part of the explanation for its low (relative to expectations) ranking.  Puerto Rico 
is near the top of the ranking only when retirement, disability and Medicare are 
considered alone.  (See Appendix I for these more detailed results.) 
 
The meaning of these net measures is not clear, and there is little rationale – if any – 
behind the idea that the payments of the states and regions to the federal government 
should balance their receipts.  Federal payments are designed to serve multiple functions, 
ranging from providing income and employment in relatively low-income regions to 
building infrastructure (e.g., highways) throughout the country to establishing military 
bases and purchasing military equipment.  There is no reason that for any state or region 
the payments should equal the receipts.  Indeed, because of an implicit federal 
commitment to support regional income convergence, it is to be expected that low-
income regions would necessarily have relatively large net receipts and relatively low 
payments.  (Moreover, as will be demonstrated shortly, if balanced fiscal relations with 
the federal government were imposed on the individual states and Puerto Rico, the 
impacts could be devastating.)  
 
Yet even accepting the net receipts measure as meaningful, Puerto Rico is far from 
the top of the list, as shown in Table 3.  Furthermore, if the data on net federal receipts 
are viewed in relation to personal income, an approach that makes Puerto Rico’s ranking 
relatively high, the island does not stand as an outlier, distinct from high recipient states.  
(See Appendix I for details.) 
 
 
III. Economic Impact 
 
There are at least two ways that the flow of federal funds to the states, Puerto Rico, 
and DC affect local economies.  On the one hand, clearly the federal funds provide a 
demand stimulus to economic activity, creating jobs and raising incomes.13  Indeed, it is 
reasonable to assume that there is a multiplier impact, with each dollar of federal funds 
going to a state creating more than a dollar of additional income in that state.  On the 
other hand, federal funds flowing to a region may have a negative impact.  A heavy 
reliance on federal defense procurements, for example, could pre-empt the development 
of other types of business activity in a region.  Or, as Burtless and Sotomayor and 
Enchautegui and Freeman argue, the flow of social welfare funds to a region might 
undermine work incentives and help explain Puerto Rico’s low labor force participation 
rate – about 47 percent as compared to 66 percent in the states. 
                                                 
13
 The stimulus is at the margin, a stimulus resulting from an extra dollar of fund going to a region, given 
the amount of taxes or federal borrowing that comes out of that region.  Whether or not the overall stimulus 
from the inflow of federal funds to a region is greater than the outflow of funds (federal taxes and 
borrowing) from that region is a separate and more complex question.  In general, however, for those 
regions (Puerto Rico, DC and several states) where the inflow of funds is substantially greater than the 
outflow of taxes and borrowing, the stimulus would clearly be positive. 
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As to the positive economic impact of the federal flow of funds to the states, DC and 
Puerto Rico, the data suggest that several states receive a larger positive stimulus than 
does Puerto Rico.  Table 4 provides a crude estimate of the impact of the demand 
stimulus provided by the flow of federal funds to Puerto Rico, the states and DC.  The 
table shows the decline (or increase) in GDP for each state, DC and Puerto Rico that 
would result from changing the net flow of federal funds to zero – that is by moving to a 
situation where the federal funds flowing to each region equaled the federal taxes flowing 
from that region, assuming a multiplier of 2.  (That is, $2 of GDP would be lost for every 
$1 reduction in the net flow of federal funds.  It should be emphasized that this is only 
illustrative, but the relative impacts in Puerto Rico and the various states would be the 
same regardless of the value of the multiplier that is assumed.  In reality, however, the 
multiplier for the different states would vary depending on the nature of federal 
expenditures and local conditions.) 
 
For Puerto Rico, the impact would be large, with a reduction of GDP of 27.7 percent 
(the right hand column of Table 4).  Or, putting things the other way, the net flow of 
funds that come to Puerto Rico can be viewed as increasing GDP by 38.4 percent over 
what it would be without the net inflow of federal funds.  However, for seven states (to 
say nothing of DC) the impact on GDP would be larger.  In this crude case, New 
Mexico’s GDP would be 43.9 percent smaller without the federal funds; West Virginia’s, 
40.5 percent smaller; and Mississippi’s 35.4 percent smaller.  Certainly Puerto Rico’s 
economy is stimulated by the net inflow of federal funds, but not as much as the 
economies of several states.   
 
Regarding the potential negative impact of the flow of federal funds, the possibility of 
the pre-emption of other types of business activity because of federal procurement is not 
of significant relevance for Puerto Rico.  But what about the impact of federal funds on 
work incentives? 
 
A determination of the role of federal funds in affecting work incentives in Puerto 
Rico would require an examination of particular programs, how they are structured, and 
how they are implemented.  Such an examination is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Burtless and Sotomayor and Enchautegui and Freeman have begun this task, and their 
analyses suggest the existence of a problem.   
 
However, the data presented here – either the aggregate flow of funds or the flow of 
funds in particular broad categories – do not suggest that Puerto Rico presents a special 
case, a case of extreme overall reliance on federal funds in a manner that would 
undermine work incentives.  The per capita federal funds received by each state, DC and 
Puerto Rico are independent of the per capita amount of taxes paid by each of these 
entities.  Therefore it is the variation of gross federal expenditures in relation to per capita 
income, not the variation of net expenditures (federal expenditures minus taxes) that 
would have an impact (if any) on work incentives.  The gross figures are those of Table 
2.  While the data in Tables 3 (and the data in the appendix tables) may be interesting and 
useful, they are largely irrelevant to the work incentives issue. 
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Table 4: Impact on Per Capita Gross Domestic Product of the States and Puerto 
Rico Assuming the Removal of All Net Federal Expenditures and a Multiplier Effect 
of 2, Fiscal Year 2004 
GDP Per 
Capita
State 
Rank
Net Expend. 
Per Capita
State 
Rank
Adjusted GDP 
Per Capita
State 
Rank
Change 
in Rank
% Change 
in GDP
Total U.S + P.R. 39,438           528                38,383               
District of Columbia 140,030         1            37,457           1            65,117               2            (1)           53.5%
New Mexico 33,439           41          7,348             3            18,744               49          (8)           43.9%
West Virginia 27,489           50          5,562             5            16,366               51          (1)           40.5%
Mississippi 26,561           51          4,700             8            17,161               50          1            35.4%
Montana 29,759           49          4,792             7            20,175               48          1            32.2%
Alabama 31,205           47          4,629             9            21,947               47          -         29.7%
Alaska 54,907           3            8,005             2            38,898               19          (16)         29.2%
North Dakota 35,771           34          5,157             6            25,457               43          (9)           28.8%
Puerto Rico 20,355           52          2,823             19          14,708               52          -         27.7%
Virginia 43,839           10          5,940             4            31,960               33          (23)         27.1%
Maine 32,840           42          4,175             12          24,489               45          (3)           25.4%
South Carolina 31,322           45          3,586             13          24,151               46          (1)           22.9%
South Dakota 38,526           22          4,389             10          29,747               38          (16)         22.8%
Kentucky 32,080           43          3,514             14          25,052               44          (1)           21.9%
Maryland 41,507           15          4,383             11          32,741               32          (17)         21.1%
Arizona 33,818           40          2,984             16          27,850               41          (1)           17.6%
Louisiana 35,473           36          2,887             18          29,698               39          (3)           16.3%
Hawaii 39,782           19          3,093             15          33,596               30          (11)         15.6%
Vermont 35,391           37          2,596             20          30,199               37          -         14.7%
Wyoming 47,563           6            2,980             17          41,603               13          (7)           12.5%
Idaho 31,228           46          1,887             21          27,453               42          4            12.1%
Oklahoma 31,740           44          1,858             22          28,025               40          4            11.7%
Utah 34,552           39          1,826             23          30,899               35          4            10.6%
Florida 35,027           38          1,677             25          31,674               34          4            9.6%
Iowa 37,303           28          1,768             24          33,767               27          1            9.5%
Tennessee 36,735           31          1,557             26          33,620               28          3            8.5%
Missouri 35,771           35          1,381             27          33,010               31          4            7.7%
Kansas 36,164           33          1,282             28          33,601               29          4            7.1%
Indiana 36,785           30          1,019             29          34,747               26          4            5.5%
Oregon 37,449           26          916                30          35,617               25          1            4.9%
Pennsylvania 37,380           27          658                32          36,064               24          3            3.5%
New Hampshire 40,080           18          689                31          38,702               20          (2)           3.4%
Washington 40,795           16          525                33          39,745               15          1            2.6%
North Carolina 37,929           24          236                34          37,457               22          2            1.2%
California 42,325           13          (62)                 35          42,449               11          2            -0.3%
Nevada 42,464           12          (129)               36          42,722               10          2            -0.6%
Rhode Island 38,722           21          (188)               37          39,097               18          3            -1.0%
Michigan 36,252           32          (225)               38          36,702               23          9            -1.2%
Georgia 38,477           23          (350)               40          39,176               17          6            -1.8%
Texas 40,160           17          (380)               41          40,921               14          3            -1.9%
Arkansas 30,048           48          (310)               39          30,668               36          12          -2.1%
Wisconsin 37,709           25          (473)               42          38,655               21          4            -2.5%
Massachusetts 48,734           5            (837)               43          50,407               6            (1)           -3.4%
Colorado 43,768           11          (906)               44          45,580               9            2            -4.1%
New York 47,162           8            (1,370)            46          49,901               7            1            -5.8%
Ohio 37,104           29          (1,181)            45          39,465               16          13          -6.4%
Nebraska 38,913           20          (1,385)            47          41,682               12          8            -7.1%
Illinois 41,981           14          (2,393)            48          46,767               8            6            -11.4%
Connecticut 52,080           4            (3,223)            49          58,525               3            1            -12.4%
New Jersey 47,168           7            (4,025)            50          55,218               5            2            -17.1%
Delaware 62,982           2            (7,010)            52          77,001               1            1            -22.3%
Minnesota 44,035           9            (5,639)            51          55,313               4            5            -25.6%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis: Regional Economic Accounts (Gross Domestic Product by State)
     Puerto Rico data from Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico
     Consolidated Federal Funds Report for Fiscal Year 2004, US Census Bureau
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The data in Table 2 presenting “Federal Government Payments to Puerto Rico Per 
Capita as a Percentage of Per Capita Personal Income” do not show Puerto Rico as an 
outlier; it is not the exceptional region.  Even looking at those categories of expenditure 
that might be associated with a negative work incentive – social security, Medicare and 
disability; other direct payments; and grants – in none does Puerto Rico rank at the top.  
Indeed, in the case of “other direct payments,” Puerto Rico ranks 7th; this category 
includes “foods stamps” (actually the Nutritional Assistance Program), often referred to 
(e.g., in the Times editorial) as a major negative work incentive in Puerto Rico.  The first 
category of Table 2, including disability payments, is one where negative work incentives 
might arise.  Even here, Puerto Rico (16.1 percent) is not at the top of the list, ranking 
second to West Virginia (17.3 percent), and not far from Mississippi, Alabama and 
Arkansas (14.6 percent, 14.5 percent and 14.5 percent, respectively).   
 
Although Puerto Rico’s situation with regard to the flow of funds from Washington is 
comparable to that of several individual states, it is still possible that the Washington 
connection may have some negative impacts on the Puerto Rican economy – but it is also 
likely that these same negative impacts would exists in some of the states, e.g., West 
Virginia and Mississippi.  In the next section, attention will be given to alternative ways 
in which the fiscal relation with Washington might be structured, ways that would have 
more positive impacts on Puerto Rico. 
 
Here, however, it is useful to note that laying the blame for the malaise of the Puerto 
Rican economy on the flow of funds from Washington is not only problematic in itself, as 
argued above.  In addition, such an explanation ignores numerous other factors affecting 
the low labor force participation rate and the weak performance of the island’s economy.  
For example: 
 
• The severe fiscal problems of the Puerto Rican government have created a degree 
of uncertainty that weakens private sector activity.  Following the crisis of spring 
2006 and the downgrading of Puerto Rican government bonds, the public sector 
has been limited in providing essential support for business in terms of 
infrastructure and other services. 
 
• The continuing debate and uncertainty over Puerto Rico’s political status 
undermines investment, as business continue to be unsure of the longer run ‘rules 
of the game.’ 
 
• Economic policy emanating from Washington and not directly related to the flow 
of funds, has been problematic.  After the early success of “Operation Bootstrap,” 
in the third quarter of the last century, there has been no effective development 
policy for the island.  Section 936, while yielding major gains for U.S. firms, did 
little to support Puerto Rican employment or economic growth. 
 
• The large informal sector, while not unrelated to the incentives embodied in 
transfer payments, has broader roots, tied to the overall structure of the Puerto 
Rican economy and the low level of income.  In this regard, Puerto Rico’s 
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experience is more reasonably compared to that of other parts of Latin America 
than to the states.  
 
• Likewise, Puerto Rico’s low level of labor force participation is partly explained 
by the role of women, perhaps more akin to that in low-income countries than to 
that in the states. 
 
• The unusual connection to the economy on the mainland generates numerous 
problems for Puerto Rico, ranging from an apparent “brain drain” to a 
disadvantageous set of incentives regarding work and education. 
 
Furthermore, there is a problem is explaining the slow growth of the Puerto Rican 
economy as a consequence of the low labor force participation rate, which in turn is seen 
by Burtless and Sotomayor as largely a result of the incentives associated with funds 
from Washington.  It is not reasonable to explain a low rate of growth by a low and 
relatively stable level of labor force participation.  Even if the low level of labor force 
participation were explained by the incentives embodied in transfer payments, that level 
has been relatively stable since the late 1970s and cannot explain the continuing slow 
growth of the economy since that time. 14   
 
Thus, beyond the analysis we have presented above, there is much more to an 
explanation of Puerto Rico’s weak economic performance in recent years than the 
structure or size of transfer payments from Washington. 
 
 
IV. Alternatives 
 
 Nonetheless, Puerto Rico does have serious economic problems.  While it is not 
reasonable to attribute these problems to the level of the federal funds that flow to the 
island, the form of those funds may be a factor.  The issues raised by Burtless and 
Sotomayor and by Enchautegui and Freeman, as well as by others, are relevant, 
notwithstanding the analysis we have developed above.  The incentives embodied in 
various federal expenditures are important aspects of economic policy in general, and 
they may be of special importance in Puerto Rico even while they may only be a part of 
the problem. 
 
 The question is: What sorts of policies are most appropriate to improve the 
incentive impact of federal funds coming to Puerto Rico?  Punitive policies such as those 
suggested by the NY Times in its reference to “shock therapy” cannot be taken seriously.  
They would, first of all, be counterproductive in that any positive incentive impact would 
likely be outweighed by the negative demand impact.  Furthermore, as the discussion 
above indicates, punitive policies toward Puerto Rico could not be justified without 
similar policies being applied to the various states.  Such policies would be more 
economically damaging to several states than to Puerto Rico (see Table 4) and are a 
political impossibility.   
                                                 
14
 See Burtless and Sotomayor’s figure on page 85. 
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There are, however, positive policies that could be adopted in structuring the flow 
of federal funds to Puerto Rico.  One of these has been given considerable attention in the 
CNE-Brookings volume, namely the extension of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
to Puerto Rico.  Making Puerto Ricans eligible for the EITC could have a considerable 
positive impact, especially if combined with an expansion in Puerto Rico of the Child 
Tax Credit (for which Puerto Ricans are now eligible only if they have three or more 
children).  A second positive policy would be expanding the amount of federal 
procurement expenditures in Puerto Rico.  
 
These sorts of policies have direct positive impacts, creating jobs and incentives 
to work.  Also, by bringing more people into the work force and raising incomes, they 
have the potential indirect impact of reducing federal transfers in those categories that are 
often cited as creating the most problematic incentive effects – i.e., the Nutritional 
Assistance Program (food stamps) and Disability Payments (under SSI).  Accordingly, in 
what follows, we examine each of these policy alternatives. 
 
A. The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit 
 
 The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC) are currently 
not available to Puerto Ricans on the island.  These tax credits are tied to the federal 
income tax, and Puerto Ricans on the island do not pay federal income tax on Puerto 
Rican source income.15   
 
 There are, however, good reasons to include Puerto Rico in these programs. A 
primary justification for the EITC has been to offset the regressive payroll taxes, and 
Puerto Ricans pay both Social Security and Medicare taxes.  Also, both credits have been 
put in place and expanded in order to alleviate poverty by supplementing earned income 
and thus providing an incentive for people to draw a paycheck.  The poverty rate in 
Puerto Rico is substantially higher than on the mainland, with about fifty percent of 
Puerto Ricans living below the poverty line.  Furthermore, the EITC has been designed to 
encourage people to participate in the paid labor force, and, as emphasized above, Puerto 
Rico has an especially low labor force participation rate.  
 
In addition, there is an issue of fairness.  In 2006, a Puerto Rican single head of a 
household with two children and earning $25,000 from work would have paid Social 
Security and Medicare taxes of $1,912.50.  A person living in the states with the same 
income form work and the same family circumstances – perhaps the sister of the person 
in Puerto Rico – would also have paid $1,912.50 in Social Security and Medicare taxes.  
But the person living in the states would have received a tax rebate of $3,627 because of 
the EITC and CTC.  Both start off with $25,000 in earned income.  The person in Puerto 
                                                 
15
 The EITC is available to Puerto Ricans if they earn incomes from work in the states and thus file federal 
income tax returns.  The CTC is available to Puerto Ricans with three or more children, as noted above.  
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Rico, after paying federal taxes, ends up with $23,087.50.  The person in the states ends 
up with $26,714.50.16   
 
 The fact that Puerto Ricans on the island do not pay federal income tax has 
sometimes been cited to justify their exclusion from the EITC and the CTC.  In fact, 
many recipients of EITC and CTC in the states do not pay any federal taxes simply 
because their incomes are too low.  Furthermore, illustrating that there is no need to tie 
the credits to federal income tax payment, Puerto Ricans who have three or more children 
can claim the CTC by filing a federal tax form but paying no federal income taxes.  The 
same procedure could be adopted for the EITC and for families with one or two 
children.17   
 
 Beyond its impact on individual families – the improvement of their living 
standards and moving them from welfare roles to paid employment – extending the EITC 
and CTC would provide a significant stimulus to the Puerto Rican economy.  The 
stimulus would be both direct, by increasing consumer demand, and indirect, by 
encouraging a higher labor force participation rate.  The impact from the expansion of 
consumer demand alone could raise overall income on the island by as much as three 
percent. (See Appendix II-C regarding the basis of this estimate.) Together, the infusion 
of funds and the greater engagement in productive work would make a major 
contribution towards transforming the island’s economy out of relative stagnation and 
onto a healthy growth rate.  
 
   Our estimate of the impact of extending the EITC and CTC to Puerto Ricans on 
the island indicates that for 2006 the cost would have been approximately $1 billion.  As 
the Puerto Rican economy grows over the next decade, costs would decline slightly each 
year because a smaller share of families would be eligible for these tax credits.  (The 
details of the procedures for these cost estimates are explained Appendix II-A.)  This $1 
billion estimate does not take into account the degree to which extending these programs 
to Puerto Rico would raise the rate of economic growth on the island, as noted above 
through both direct stimulus and greater labor force participation. More rapid economic 
growth would raise incomes and move many Puerto Ricans to positions where they 
would no longer receive (or need) these credits.  Thus, in a sense, the extension of the 
EITC and CTC to Puerto Rico would in effect be partially self-financing. 
                                                 
16
 These figures were generated using TurboTax 2006. 
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 There is, however, an additional and different issue of fairness. Were these credits extended to Puerto 
Rico, the fact that Puerto Ricans do not pay federal income tax would make it necessary to enact an 
adjustment in their application on the island.  In the states, when the income level of a family is high 
enough so that without the EITC and CTC the family would be paying some tax, the family’s refund from 
these programs amounts to the credits minus the tax owed.  Applied to Puerto Rico, where the family 
would not be libel for any federal income tax, the refund would be larger for any level of income (at higher 
levels of eligibility for the credits).  It would seem appropriate, therefore, in extending the EITC and CTC 
to Puerto Rico that the refund be no greater than it would be for an equivalent family in states.  In all the 
cost calculations discussed here, it is assumed that such a “cap” on EITC and CTC refunds would be 
enacted for Puerto Rico. (See the example in Appendix II.) 
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We have used an input-output framework to trace the demand impact of this 
additional $1 billion. The open input-output model was solved by assuming the $1 billion 
was distributed according to proportions derived from the vector of consumer 
expenditures of input-output data bank. Table 5A below summarizes the results. 
 
The data of Table 5A show that if EITC and CTC programs had been extended to 
Puerto Ricans during year 2006 direct and indirect employment would have increased by 
15,474.  Had labor force remained unchanged the additional employment would had 
reduced the unemployment rate of fiscal year 2006 by one percentage point (from 11.7% 
to 10.7%).  Value added in the form of wage income would have increased by $242.9 
million at constant 1992 prices and 320.1 million at current 2006 prices. 
 
In terms of the impact on particular sectors, wholesale and retail trade, other 
services (specially professional services) and manufacturing would had greatly benefited  
in terms of jobs and income created.  The impacts by sector are shown in Table 5B. 
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Table 5A 
 
 
 
 
Table 5B 
 
 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT  IMPACT OF EXTENDING THE EITC AND CTC TO 
PUERTO RICANS ASSUMING $1 BILLION INITIAL COST, HAD THE PROGRAM 
 INITIATED IN YEAR 2006
Final Demand (in thousand dollars)
    Constant 1992 prices 777,959.0
    Current prices 1,000,000
Output (in thousand dollars)
    Constant 1992 prices 1,138,613.7
    Current prices 1,807,043.1
Direct and Indirect employment 15,474
Direct and Indirect Income (in thousand dollars)
    Constant 1992 prices 242,921.5
    Current prices 320,072.0
IMPACT OF EXTENDING  EITC AND CTC PROGRAMS TO PUERTO RICANS ASSUMING AND INITIAL 
COST OF  $I BILLION, FISCAL YEAR 2006
Final Direct and Indirect
Demand Output Direct and Indirect Income
Industrial Sector (in thousand $) (in thousand $) Employment (in thousand $)
Agriculture 7,004.0 17,995.7 554 5,651.9
Mining and Construction 0.0 16,321.6 214 2,400.8
Manufacturing 133,458.0 203,766.5 1,565 46,376.8
Transportation, Communications and
Public Utilities 60,587.0 112,077.1 1,287 30,890.7
Wholesale and Retail trade 262,107.0 309,121.0 4,406 55,961.9
Finances, Insurance and Real State 173,322.0 251,295.4 780 18,935.3
Other Services 123,473.0 199,758.9 5,894 64,253.3
Govrnment 18,008.0 28,277.7 774 18,450.8
Total 777,959.0 1,138,613.7 15,474 242,921.5
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B. Federal Procurement Expenditures 
 
 As pointed out above, Puerto Rico receives an especially small amount of funds 
from the federal government in terms of procurements.  In terms of receipts per capita, 
Puerto Rico ranks behind all of the states and DC, receiving only 11.1 percent of the 
average.  When the figures are computed in relation to per capita personal income, only 
one state ranks below Puerto Rico (Delaware, with a relatively high income and a small 
amount of federal procurement); by this measure, Puerto Rico gets 30.3 percent of the 
average. (See Tables 1 and 2.)  Federal procurement expenditures, as payments for goods 
and services, directly create jobs and bring people into the labor force. 
 
 While federal procurements are formally expenditures to meet particular needs of 
the federal government (and do serve those needs), it is widely recognized that they are 
distributed among the states in a political process.  They are, moreover, often used to 
create jobs and bolster income in relatively low-income states. It is noteworthy, therefore, 
that Puerto Rico receives such a small share of federal procurement expenditures.   
 
 How would Puerto Rico be affected were it to receive a larger amount of these 
expenditures?  In 2004, Puerto Rico received $462 million in this category, or $119 per 
capita.  It seems reasonable to suggest that Puerto Rico’s share of federal procurements 
should be what its economy could manage, and its economy is smaller than that of the 
average in the states.  If Puerto Rico were to receive a share of federal procurements 
expenditures equal to that of states in relation to per capita income (one measure of the 
capacity of the economy), the $462 million would rise to $1.391 billion, an increase of 
$929 million.  Alternatively, if Puerto Rico were to receive a share of federal 
procurements expenditures equal to that of states in relation to per GDP (an alternative 
and substantially larger measure of the capacity of the economy), the $462 million would 
rise to $2.088 billion, an increase of $1.626 billion.   
 
We have then carried out two input-output experiments, increasing federal 
procurements as follows: 
 
• $1,391 million, or an increase of $929 million, representing what Puerto Rico 
would get if it got the same as the states on per capita income basis.  
 
• $2,088 million, or an increase of $1,626 million, representing what Puerto Rico 
would get if it got the same as the states on a per capita GDP basis 
 
The above figures were distributed to the final demand vector of our input-output model 
by using proportions of 2004 procurement expenses of federal government by industrial 
sector.  The results of the experiments are shown in Table 6 below. 
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Table 6  
 
 
SUMMARY RESULTS OF TWO EXPERIMENTS:  INCREASING ACTUAL 2004 PROCUREMENT FIGURES 
 BY $1,626 AND $929 MILLION RESPECTIVELY (thousand dollars)
First Experiment: Second Experiment:
Actual Final Increasing  Increasing
Demand Procurements Procurements
Procurement, 2004 by $1,626 million  by $929 million
Procurement Asigned to Final Demand
Constant 1992 prices 368,379 1,626,000 929,000
Current 2004 prices 462000 1,664,883 1,109,125
Output Generated
Constant 1992 prices 545,368.1 2,464,780.7 1,642,006.6
Current 2004 prices 802,886.1 3,628,628.5 2,417,347.8
Direct and Indirect Employment 6,290 28,428 18,939
Direct and Indirect Income
Constant 1992 prices 104,276.1 471,274.0 313,956.9
Current 2004 prices 125,162.4 565,669.3 376,842.0
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Both experiments indicate that the impact on increased federal procurements 
expenditures on employment would have been quite significant.  In the first experiment, 
with the larger increase in federal procurement expenditures, the direct and indirect 
employment increase amounted to 28,428.  If the labor force had remained constant at 
1,360,000, employment would have increased from 1,206,000 to 1,234,428 reducing the 
unemployment rate from 11.4% to 9.3%.  In the second experiment the unemployment 
rate for fiscal year 2004 would had been reduced from 11.4% to 10%.  
 
Gross Domestic Product is approximately 50% of gross output (intermediate plus 
final demand). Assuming this percentage, in the first experiment GDP would have 
increased from 79,209.4 to 82,838.03.  From 2003 to 2004 the rate of increase of GDP (at 
constant prices) was 3.0%.  Adding the results of the first experiment, the GDP increase 
would have been 5.4%, or 2.4% more than the actual figure. For illustration purposes the 
results were obtained under the assumption that the whole impact was felt in year 2004 
which of course it is not necessarily true.  
 
As with the impact of extending the EITC and CTC to Puerto Rico, this infusion 
of federal expenditures could yield a substantial increase in the level of economic 
activity.  While increased federal procurements do not embody the explicit work 
incentives that are embodied in tax credits, they are certainly employment generating. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
The data and discussion presented here do not support the assertion that Puerto 
Rico is the unusual case, the extreme exception, with regard to its receipt of federal 
funds.  When compared to the situation of the various states and DC, by none of the 
measures presented here does Puerto Rico stand out alone; by few measures is it at the 
top of the list, and by many measures it is at the bottom.  Also, with regard to simply the 
transfer payments component of the funds that flow from Washington to Puerto Rico, the 
term “generous,” with all its implications, does not seem appropriate. 
 
Furthermore, if a major reason for the federal government to provide funds to 
states and other localities is to generate a greater degree of income equality across the 
country – a convergence of income levels – then Puerto Rico and the low income states 
(several of the highest ranking states in Table 3) will necessarily get larger amounts of 
federal funds.  Thus it is important to recognize the fact that Puerto Rico does not receive 
more federal funds, in spite of the ostensible equalizing goal of federal expenditures and 
in spite of the island’s low level of income relative to the states.   
 
Of course what distinguishes Puerto Rico in any comparisons with the states is 
that it is not a state.  While the flow of funds from Washington to the various sections of 
the country is in part determined by general goals, such as the goal of achieving a 
convergence of incomes, it is also determined politically, by the influence of each state’s 
representatives in Congress and by the concern of the Executive for the popular vote in 
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each state.  Puerto Rico does not have representatives in Congress and Puerto Ricans do 
not vote in presidential elections.  Thus the fact that Puerto Rico does not receive more 
federal funds – especially in the salaries and wages and procurement categories – should 
be no surprise.18   
 
 There are ways that the form of Puerto Rico’s receipts from the federal 
government could be improved, providing a better foundation for the economic 
development of the island.  Such improvement could be achieved by positive rather than 
punitive changes.  In particular, the extension to Puerto Rico of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit and the Child Tax Credit would be a good start, and this start could be followed by 
an increase in Puerto Rico’s share of federal procurement expenditures. 
 
                                                 
18
 The generally high ranking of West Virginia in the various measures discussed above is perhaps a good 
illustration of the importance of political representation in affecting the flow of federal funds.  Its ranking 
might be dubbed “The Byrd Effect,” though other factors are surely involved. 
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Appendix I 
Net Receipts of Federal Funds: Details on “The Highest  
Ranking Recipient States and Puerto Rico 
 
Tables A1, A2 and A3 present additional data on per capita net receipts of federal 
funds for Puerto Rico and “the highest ranking recipient states”.  “The highest ranking 
recipient states” in these three tables are taken from Table 3; they are the ten states that 
receive the largest net amount of federal expenditures per capita – i.e., total federal 
expenditures per capita going to the state less total taxes per capita going to the federal 
government from the state.   
 
Table A1, presents the data of Table 3, net receipts of federal funds per capita, broken 
down by major categories.  The column at the far right, column 5, shows the ten highest 
ranking states in order, 2 through 11 (with DC, number 1 in Table 3, excluded) followed 
by Puerto Rico at 19.  The first column in Table A1 shows the total payments for 
“retirement, disability, and Medicare” received in a state or Puerto Rico minus the total 
federal taxes paid by that state or Puerto Rico.  The columns are then additive, moving 
from left to right, and the pattern and ranking are tracked for the ten highest ranking 
recipient states as shown in column 5.  Thus in column 1 of Table A1, in fiscal year 2004 
West Virginia’s per capita receipt of payments in the category “retirement, disability and 
Medicare” exceeded per capita all taxes paid to the federal government by $1,588; for 
Puerto Rico, the figure was $724; for Mississippi $487, and for Montana $26.  For all 
other states (and DC), the figure was negative – that is, they paid more in taxes of all 
sorts to the federal government than they received from the federal government in this 
one category.  In Column 2, the per capita receipt of payments in the first two categories 
combined (retirement, disability and Medicare plus other transfer payments) for West 
Virginia exceeded per capita all taxes paid to the federal government by $4,042; for 
Puerto Rico, the figure was $2,427.  For these two categories taken together Puerto 
Rico’s ranking dropped to 8th.     
 
In Table A2 the figures of Table A1 are presented as a percentage of state (or Puerto 
Rican) Gross Domestic Product per capita, and in Table A3 the figures of Table A1 are 
presented as a percentage of Personal Income per capita.19  In these tables, Puerto Rico’s 
relatively low income and Puerto Rican’s lack of federal income tax liability combine to 
move the island well up in the rankings.   
 
However, even in Table A3, which presents the data in a manner that makes Puerto 
Rico’s ranking relatively high, the island does not stand as an outlier, distinct from high 
recipient states.  In particular, Puerto Rico does not rank number one for the first and 
largest category of expenditures – retirement, disability, and Medicare.  Furthermore, 
Puerto Rico drops out of the number one position when all federal wages and salaries and 
procurements are taken into account.  Also, for all categories of expenditures, Puerto 
                                                 
19
 The figures for Puerto Rico in Tables A2 and A3 are substantially different because GDP in Puerto Rico 
is much greater than Personal Income (or Gross National Product) because such a large share of Puerto 
Rico’s GDP is the profits of non-Puerto Rican based firms.  In 2004, GNP was about 64 percent of GDP in 
Puerto Rico. 
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Rico’s situation overall is not dramatically different from that of some of the “highest 
ranking recipient states;” overall Puerto Rico trails New Mexico (with DC in the number 
1 position) and is nearly on par with Alaska and West Virginia.   
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Table A1: The Ten Highest Ranking Recipient States and Puerto Rico, Ranked by Total Net Per Capita Federal Expenditures;
and the Ranking of those States and Puerto Rico when the Various Categories of Federal Expenditures are Factored In - 
Fiscal Year 2004*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net 
Retirement, 
Disability + 
Medicare
State 
Rank
(1) + Other 
Transfers
State 
Rank
(2) + EITC + 
CTC
State 
Rank
(3) + Salaries 
and Wages
State 
Rank
(4) + Procure-
ments
State 
Rank
Average U.S + P.R. (3,496)            (1,500)                (1,292)            (549)               528                  
Alaska (2,899)            28      2,593                 7        2,775             7        5,411             2        8,005               2        
New Mexico (34)                 5        2,862                 4        3,121             5        4,209             5        7,348               3        
Virginia (2,746)            26      (1,182)                29      (986)               29      1,204             20      5,940               4        
West Virginia 1,588             1        4,042                 1        4,240             1        4,988             3        5,562               5        
North Dakota (1,160)            12      2,940                 3        3,123             4        4,364             4        5,157               6        
Montana 26                  4        3,001                 2        3,203             2        4,159             6        4,792               7        
Mississippi 487                3        2,827                 5        3,162             3        3,883             7        4,700               8        
Alabama (59)                 6        1,893                 10      2,181             9        2,951             9        4,629               9        
South Dakota (1,025)            11      2,628                 6        2,829             6        3,821             8        4,389               10      
Maryland (3,808)            37      (1,442)                34      (1,253)            34      640                25      4,383               11      
Puerto Rico 724                2        2,427                 8        2,440             8        2,704             11      2,823               19      
* "Total Net Per Capita Federal Expenditures" are total federal expenditures going to a state or Puerto Rico less all taxes paid to the federal government
from that state or Puerto Rico.  Ranking is based on Table 3.  See text for further explanation.
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Table A2: Net Per Capita Federal Expenditures of the Ten Highest Ranking Recipient States and Puerto Rico,  
Expressed as a Percenage of Gross Domestic Product Per Capita -
Fiscal Year 2004*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net 
Retirement, 
Disability + 
Medicare By 
GDP
State 
Rank
(1) + Other 
Transfers By 
GDP
State 
Rank
(2) + EITC + 
CTC By GDP
State 
Rank
(3) + Salaries 
and Wages 
By GDP
State 
Rank
(4) + 
Procurements 
By GDP
State 
Rank
Average U.S + P.R. -8.9% -3.8% -3.3% -1.4% 1.3%
Alaska -5.3% 18      4.7% 11      5.1% 11      9.9% 8        14.6% 7        
New Mexico -0.1% 5        8.6% 5        9.3% 5        12.6% 5        22.0% 2        
Virginia -6.3% 24      -2.7% 29      -2.3% 29      2.7% 23      13.5% 10      
West Virginia 5.8% 1        14.7% 1        15.4% 1        18.1% 1        20.2% 3        
North Dakota -3.2% 12      8.2% 6        8.7% 6        12.2% 6        14.4% 8        
Montana 0.1% 4        10.1% 4        10.8% 4        14.0% 3        16.1% 5        
Mississippi 1.8% 3        10.6% 3        11.9% 3        14.6% 2        17.7% 4        
Alabama -0.2% 6        6.1% 8        7.0% 8        9.5% 10      14.8% 6        
South Dakota -2.7% 10      6.8% 7        7.3% 7        9.9% 7        11.4% 13      
Maryland -9.2% 37      -3.5% 33      -3.0% 33      1.5% 25      10.6% 15      
Puerto Rico 3.6% 2        11.9% 2        12.0% 2        13.3% 4        13.9% 9        
* The "highest ranking recipient states" are those from Table A1.
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Table A3: Net Per Capita Federal Expenditures of the Ten Highest Ranking Recipient States and Puerto Rico,
Expressed as a Percentage of Personal Income Per Capita -
Fiscal Year 2004*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net 
Retirement, 
Disability + 
Medicare By 
Personal Inc.
State 
Rank
(1) + Other 
Transfers By 
Personal 
Income
State 
Rank
(2) + EITC + 
CTC By 
Personal 
Income
State 
Rank
(3) + Salaries 
and Wages 
By Personal 
Income
State 
Rank
(4) + Procure-
ments By 
Personal 
Income
State 
Rank
Average U.S + P.R. -10.7% -4.6% -4.0% -1.7% 1.6%
Alaska -8.5% 27      7.6% 8        8.1% 8        15.9% 5        23.5% 4        
New Mexico -0.1% 5        10.9% 4        11.9% 4        16.1% 4        28.1% 2        
Virginia -7.6% 22      -3.3% 29      -2.7% 29      3.3% 22      16.4% 10      
West Virginia 6.2% 1        15.7% 2        16.5% 2        19.4% 3        21.6% 5        
North Dakota -3.9% 13      9.9% 6        10.6% 6        14.8% 8        17.4% 7        
Montana 0.1% 4        10.9% 5        11.6% 5        15.0% 7        17.3% 8        
Mississippi 2.0% 3        11.5% 3        12.9% 3        15.9% 6        19.2% 6        
Alabama -0.2% 6        6.8% 9        7.9% 9        10.7% 10      16.7% 9        
South Dakota -3.4% 10      8.7% 7        9.4% 7        12.7% 9        14.5% 11      
Maryland -9.6% 31      -3.6% 30      -3.2% 31      1.6% 26      11.1% 15      
Puerto Rico 6.1% 2        20.5% 1        20.6% 1        22.8% 2        23.8% 3        
* The "highest ranking recipient states" are those from Table A1.
 
 
  
Appendix II – Estimating the Aggregate Fiscal Impact of Extending the Earned 
Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit to Puerto Rico 
 
1. As a basis for the cost estimates, data were obtained from the Puerto Rican Junta de 
Planificación and the Statistical Abstract of the United States.  These data for Puerto Rico 
included: total personal income, population, number of families, average family size, 
number of families with children under 18, number of two families with two married 
parents present and two children under 18, number of families headed by a female with 
two children under 18.  For 2006, however, these data were not yet available.  Estimates 
were obtained for 2006 by assuming that the growth rate of the previous two years was 
maintained (in the cases of personal income and population) and assuming that the 
proportional breakdown of the population did not change (for the other categories).   
 
2. From “Development and Income Distribution: The Case of Puerto Rico” by Orlando 
Sotomayor (World Development, 32:8, 2004), data were obtained on income distribution 
by deciles for 2000.  It was then assumed that the distribution of income was the same in 
2006.  Sotomayor’s data are for households, they were used here as proxy for family 
income distribution.  It was assumed that For families with two married parents present, it 
was assumed that they were spread across the income distribution in the same manner as 
families in general.  For families headed by a single female parent, it was assumed tha all 
were in the bottom seven deciles of the income distribution, with one-seventh of these 
families in each of those decile groups. 
 
3. With the data on total personal income and population, per capita personal income was 
calculated.  Using data on average family size, average family income was obtained; this 
figure was multiplied by the number of families to obtain total family income (which was 
90% of total personal income).  Using the figure for total family income and the 
distribution data, the total income received by each decile of the families was computed.  
Then, dividing this figure by the number of families in each decile, the average income 
received in each decile group was obtained. 
 
4. For each such decile average, TurboTax for 2006 was used to calculate the federal 
refund that would come to each family (two parent and one parent families separately), 
with the assumption that all families had had two children.  This average federal refund 
figure was then multiplied by the number of families in each decile category to obtain the 
total refund for each decile group.  The total refunds for each decile group – two parent 
and single parent – were then added to obtain the total refund for the year. 
 
5. However, as pointed out above (see footnote 17), on the mainland, when the income 
level of a family is high enough so that without the EITC and CTC the family would be 
paying some federal income tax, the family’s refund from these programs amounts to the 
credits minus the tax owed.  Applied to Puerto Rico, where the family would not be libel 
for any income tax, the refund would be larger for any level of income (at higher levels of 
eligibility for the credits).  It would seem appropriate, therefore, in extending the EITC 
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and CTC to Puerto Rico that the refund be no greater than it would be for an equivalent 
family in states.  In all the cost calculations discussed here, it is assumed that such a 
“cap” on EITC and CTC refunds would be enacted for Puerto Rico. 
 
 
 
 
